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This article begins with the premise that, for the most part, the
scope of public and private rights in navigable waters within the various states is determined under applicable state law. The scope of these
rights is indeed a large subject; this article is but one segment of a
larger, comprehensive study of public and private rights in navigable
waters. The first part of the study was published earlier in this journal,
and there it was indicated that this second part would cover the "scope"
of rights in navigable waters. However, for mechanical reasons unrelated to the interdependent character of the subject matter of the
larger study, the full "scope" of these rights cannot be presented in
this issue of the journal. Instead, the focus here will be on statutory
approaches which create dimensions for legal rights as they exist in
navigable waters. The third and final portion of the larger study will
be published in a subsequent issue of this journal and will explore the
scope of public and private rights as developed in case decisions.

PUBLIC RIGHTS IN NAVIGABLE
STATE WATERS--SOME
STATUTORY APPROACHES
Leighton L. Leighty*
As long ago as the Institutes of Justinian, running
waters, like the air and the sea, were res communesthings common to all and property of none. * *
I. INTRODUCTION
AVTNO developed the source of public and private rights
in navigable waters in the context of federal limitations,
this article will continue the discussion of the scope of these
rights under state statutory controls. Each state as a sovereign
political unit has the requisite imperium to exercise nearly
plenary control over the water and other natural resources
H
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within its territorial jurisdiction. As indicated in the first
part of this study, each state acquired its sovereignty under
applicable principles of international law or under the constitutional doctrine of "equal footing." For purposes of creating a federal union, the states relinquished certain aspects of
their otherwise unlimited territorial sovereignty to the federal
government. These are enumerated in the federal constitution and were discussed in part one. Therefore, under our
constitutional form of government, state sovereignty implies
that (except as limited by the federal constitution and respectively by the pertinent state constitution) each state has absolute, plenary authority to regulate and control its internal
natural resources.1
"Sovereignty" in this context is a collective concept with
the residual source of power being in the people of the state.'
As their representative, the legislature may regulate and control natural resources under the "police power," one of the
overt manifestations or prongs of the concept of state sovereignty. As a general rule, the state legislature has the exclusive authority to exercise this power.' Moreover, control of
1.

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Manigault v.
Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); accord, United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707 (1950); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) ; see Skiriotes
v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). In Tennessee Copper the Court indicates that
each state, in its sovereign capacity, "has an interest independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.
It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might have to pay individuals before it could utter that word, but with it remains the final power."
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., supra at 237. Even without compensation,
the state legislature may decide to destroy one privately held natural
resource to preserve another. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See
also COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1-2 (5th ed. 1883) (definition
of "sovereignty").
2. See generally Chisolm v. Georgia, 1 U.S. 16, 2 Dall. 419, 469 (1793). For
a discussion of several of the early theoretical bases for "sovereignty" see
BLISS, OF SOVEREIGNTY (1885). See also BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 98-160 (1966); O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 319
(1965); DAVIS, THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-54 (1908); WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.§ 37 (1&78).

In this context the state's governmental structures merely represent
political legitimacy for purposes of expressing this power. See Chisholm v.
Georgia, supra at 472. See also Geer v. Connecticut, supra note 1; Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. LAW REV. 471 (1970).
3. Compare City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907);
Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, on rehearing 55 N.W.2d 40, 43-45 (1952).
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navigable waters is an inherent attribute of state sovereignty;
the United States Supreme Court has said, "Dominion over
navigable waters and property in the soil under them are so
identified with the sovereign power of government that a
presumption against their separation from sovereignty must
be indulged .... '

Assuming that the analysis in the first part of this study
was correct, the federal test for navigability is mandatory
only with respect to the narrow issue of bed title.5 The federal
test as described in The Daniel Ball will be applied as of the
date on which a state was admitted to the union to determine
which submerged lands beneath inland lakes and streams
passed into state ownership and which lands remained available for private acquisition.' Of course, if a state elects to
limit its exercises of sovereign power over navigable water to
those areas for which it possesses bed title," it may do so. On
the other hand, however, a state is not required to constrict its
controls in this manner, and as will be discussed, a state has
the theoretical legal basis for broad controls over internal
water resources. The controlled waters need not be limited
to any test of "navigability." Waters within a state may
simply be declared a "public resource."'
The United States Supreme Court has not yet definitively
established the outer limits beyond which state legislatures
may not go in their extensions of public rights to recreational
use and enjoyment of waters within a state. The most ambiguous areas are small, nonnavigable feeder streams where
bed title is in private ownership and nonnavigable lakes having neither inlet nor outlet and being entirely surrounded by
private riparian (littoral) ownership. At some point the
question of how far public rights may be expanded without
the exercise of the police power being denominated an uncon4. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
5. See generally Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds
on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NATURAL RESoURCEs J. 1 (1967); Note,
Water Recreation-Public Use of "Private" Waters, 52 CALiF. L. REV. 171
(1964).
6. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 39 U.S.L. WEEK 4717 (U.S. June 7, 1971);
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1931).
7. Compare N.D. CODE ANN. § 61-15-02 (1960) with S.D.C.L.A. §§ 43-17-1,
43-17-2 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 65-1-14 (1968).
8. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (1958) (Supp. 1970).
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stitutional "taking," must be answered.' A related question
(or perhaps another statement of the same question) is
whether, given the usufructuary character of recreational uses
of lakes and streams, "property" and "property rights" (in
a constitutional sense) exist in such waters."0 The basic distinctions have been settled for a considerable length of time.
Chief Justice Shaw announced the classic statement:
9.

See People ex rel. Deneen v. Economy Light & Power Co., 241 11. 290, 89
N.E. 760 (1909) ; McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336 (1868) ; Murray v. Preston,
106 Ky. 561, 50 S.W. 1095 (1899); Thunder Bay River Booming Co. v.
Speechly, 31 Mich. 336 (1875). See generally, COOLEY, supra note 1 at 729;
Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW
131, 133-268 (University of Michigan Law School) (1958) ; HINES, A
DECADE

OF

EXPERIENCE

UNDER

THE

IOWA

WATER

PERMIT

SYSTEM

73-84

(Univ. of Iowa Agricultural Law Center Monograph No. 9, 1966); O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute-The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses of Water, 47 IOWA L. REV. 549, 581-609 (1962) ; Sax, Taking and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964) ; Waite, Public Rights in Indiana
Waters, 37 IND. L. J. 467, 480-83 (1962); Waite, Beneficial Use of Water
in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 864, 872; Note, Fishing and
Recreation Rights in Iowa Lakes and Streams, 53 IOWA L. REV. 1322 (1968).
"The right which the owner of lands has to a water-course flowing
over them . . . cannot be taken from him constitutionally for public use
without just compensation." McCord v. High, supra at 342. "The state
cannot do it nor authorize anyone else to do it." Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217
Minn. 536, 545, 15 N.W.2d 174, 179 (1944). Justice Cooley, supra, summarizes the point:
All navigable waters are for the use of all the citizens; and there
cannot lawfully be any exclusive private appropriation of any portion
of them. The question what is a navigable stream would seem to be
a mixed question of law and fact; and though it is said that the
legislature of the State may determine whether a stream shall be
considered a public highway or not, yet if in fact it is not one, the
legislature cannot make it so by simple declaration, since, if it is
private property, the legislature cannot appropriate it to a public
use without providing for compensation.
10. Most of the authors cited in note 9, supra, raise this issue. See also Note,
The State v. The Riparian: A Problem of Water Use and Control, 1961
WASH. U.L.Q. 257.
One court has stated that "neither sovereign nor subject can acquire
anything more than a mere usufructuary right" in the corpus of a flowing
stream. Sweet v. City of Syracuse, 129 N.Y. 316, 335, 27 N.E. 1081,
1084, rehearing,129 N.Y. 643, 29 N.E. 289 (1891). This approach might negate the concept of a state navigational servitude as the basis for regulation
without compensation. On the other hand, if this is the fundamental character of riparian rights vis a vis the rights of other riparians and of the
public to surface recreational uses-then one might easily conclude that
indeed there is no "property" in the constitutional sense and that all state
legislative controls which expand or limit these uses are merely regulations
concerning human conduct. No cases have taken this approach, but broad
controls in favor of community use of natural resources have been sustained.
See State v. McKinnon, 153 Me. 15, 133 A.2d 885 (1957). See generally
Lauer, eupra note 9 at 169-75; Note, Water Recreation--Public Use of
"Private" Waters, supra note 5. An area of study in which more
research is needed and in which useful comparisons might be produced is
the contrasting of judicial attitudes toward land use controls with those
toward navigable and other "public" waters. A fruitful exploration, beyond
the scope of this article, might begin with the following cases: State v.
Johnson, --- Me......, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) ; State v. McKinnon, supra;
Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 106 865 (1919) ; State v. Brace, 76 N.D.
314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466
268 A.2d 765 (1970); State v. Dexter, 32 Wash.2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (1949).
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We think it is a settled principle, growing out of
the nature of well ordered civil society, that every
holder of property, however absolute and unqualified
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior
as that bordering on tide waters, is derived directly
or indirectly from the government, and held subject to
those general regulations, which are necessary to the
common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are
subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious, and
to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent
domain, the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the
public exigency requires it; which can be done only on
condition of providing a reasonable compensation
therefor. The power we allude to is rather the police
power, the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the
existence and sources of this power, than to mark its
boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise.
the facts and circumstances of different cases are so
various, that it is often difficult to decide whether a
particular exercise of legislation is properly attributable to the one or the other of these two acknowledged
powers."
11. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-86 (1851).
erally Sax, supra note 9.
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However, these general rules do not explain the significance
of legislative declarations that certain waters are "public.'12
Similarly, merely to state in a statute that vested rights are to
be given a fully protected status does little toward an explanation of the nature of the respective interests of the public and
of private riparian landowners-both glibly referred to as
'rights.'
On the other hand, the high Court has manifested some
indications of support for nearly plenary state control over
8
water resources. For example, in Manigault v. Springs"
riparian owners in South Carolina entered into a contract for
the removal of an existing dam and to keep the creek free for
navigation purposes. Subsequently, the South Carolina General Assembly passed an act, reciting the necessity of draining
low-lands to enhance their tax value, under which some of the
riparian parties to the contract were authorized to construct
a dam across the creek (subject to a proviso for paying damages to landowners injured by the dam's construction or maintenance.) The South Carolina Constitution provides:
All navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens of the State and the United
States without tax, impost or toll imposed; and no
tax, toll, impost or wharfage shall be imposed ... for
the use of the shores or any wharf erected ... in or
over the waters of any navigable stream unless the
same be authorized by the General Assembly."'
The Court found that this state constitutional provision did
not interfere with the state's common law powers over navigable waters. The Court held:
While, as already observed, there is a general
allegation in the bill that Kinloch creek was a navigable stream, and was capable of navigation by vessels in the Santee river and thence into the ocean,
there is no allegation that it was ever used for that
purpose, and the opinion of the court was that it certainly was not a navigable water of the United States,
12. Judicial vacillation is common. See, e.g., State v. Brace, supra note 10.
See generally Lauer, supra note 9.
13. 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
14. So. CAR. CONST. art. 1 § 28. This section was asserted in the context of
section 29 which indicates that state constitutional provisions in South
Carolina, when applicable, are mandatory and not merely permissive.
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or a public highway under the laws of South Carolina.
But, however this may be, we are of [the] opinion
that the state had full power, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to authorize the construction of
this dam for the avowed purposes of this act. 5
In subsequent use of the Manigault case the Supreme
Court has stated:
The economic interests of the state may justify the
exercise of its continuing and dominant protective
power notwithstanding interference with contracts.
In Manigault v. Springs... The Court sustained the
statute upon the ground that the private interests
6
[Emphasis
were subservient to the public right."
Added.]
It is manifest from this review of our decisions
that there has been a growing appreciation of public
needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a
rational compromise between individual rights and
public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation of the activities of our people and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led
to an increased use of the organization of society in
order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity.
It is no answer to say that this public need was
not apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what
the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision
of that day it must mean to the vision of our time."
In like manner, a New Jersey statute made it unlawful to
transport the waters of any fresh water lake or stream into
any other state, and state enforcement of the statute was upheld by the Supreme Court:
. . . .But we prefer to put the authority, which cannot be denied to the state, upon a broader ground
than that which was emphasized below, since, in our
15. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 483 (1905).
16. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934).
17. Id. at 442.
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opinion, it is independent of the more or less attenuated residuum of title that the state may be said to

possess.
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to
their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by
the neighborhood of principles of policy which are
other than those on which the particular right is
founded, and which become strong enough to hold
their own when a certain point is reached. The limits
set to property by other public interests present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power
of the state. The boundary at which the conflicting
interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or
that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.
It sometimes is difficult to fix boundary stones
between the private right of property and the police
power when, as in the case at bar, we know of few decisions that are very much in point. But it is recognized that the state as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the public has a standing
in court to protect the atmosphere, the water and the
forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent
or dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately concerned.
[I]t appears to us that few public interests are
more obvious, indisputable, and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a state
to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon
them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect
use. This public interest is omnipresent wherever
there is a state, and grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of the
opinion that the private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper roots.
Whether it be said that such an interest justifies the
cutting down by statute, without compensation, in the
exercise of the police power, of what otherwise would
be private rights of property, or that, apart from
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/1
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statute, those rights do not go to the height of what
the defendant seeks to do, the result is the same. But
we agree with the New Jersey courts, and think it
quite beyond any rational view of riparian rights, that
an agreement, of no matter what private owners,
could sanction the diversion of an important stream
outside the boundaries of the state in which it flows. 8
In short, the precise question of the permissible range of
state legislative controls over recreational surface uses may
be ripe for determination. It appears that, even in the narrow context of ownership of bed title, the Court's dicta supports broad legislative controls:
It is not for a state by courts or legislature, in
dealing with the general subject of beds of streams, to
adopt a retroactive rule for determining navigability
which would destroy a title already accrued under
federal law and grant or would enlarge what actually
passed to the state, at the time of her admission, under
the constitutional rule of equality here invoked.
Some states have sought to retain title to the beds
of streams by recognizing them as navigable when
they are not actually so. It seems to be a convenient
method of preserving their control. No one can object
to it unless it is sought thereby to conclude one whose
right to the bed of the river, granted and vesting before statehood, depends for its validity on nonnavigability of the stream in fact. In such a case, navigability vel non is not a local question."5
Moreover, state cases have frequently upheld broad exercises
of the police power over natural resources to promote public
considerations despite claims of detriment by private interests."°
18. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1908).
19. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1922).
20. See, e.g., State v. McKinnon, 153 Me. 15, 133 A.2d 885 (1957); State v.
Dexter, 32 Wash.2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (1949). But see Hartman v. Tresise,
36 Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905) ; State v. Johnson, ___ Me-....265 A.2d 711
(1970); State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949). See also American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal & Food Comm'n, 268 F. 563 (D. Ind.
1920).
Most of the decided cases focus upon a "conservation" issue rather
than on problems of resource development. For example, the Dexter court
stated: "That the protection and conservation of the natural resources of
the state is in the general welfare and serve a public purpose, and so
constitute a reasonable exercise of the police power, is now so well settled
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STATE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The areas of state legislative control over navigable waters
have included the problems of conservation and preservation, surface use, fills and other alterations, and access. Navigation itself, of course, is the fundamental basis for sovereign
controls over these resource problem areas, but striking a
meaningful, pragmatic definition of "navigability" has
eluded both courts and legislatures. "Navigation" under the
traditional concepts of commerce has not created significant
problems." Here navigability is usually obvious.22 On the
other hand, recreational surface uses were not always included
in "navigation" and were treated on a different basis at early
common law. 3 Where these uses were the only feasible ones,
given the character and carrying capacity of a particular
water resource, recreational uses had to be made part of
"commerce," accepted under a different standard," or rejected entirely.
A. Balancing of Interests
The resolution of the problem areas listed above will, of
necessity, require a balancing of public and private interests.
Emphasis in this article is placed on public interests for two
reasons-procedurally, the larger study adopted this organithat no further citation of authority is necessary." State v. Dexter, supra
at 557, 202 P.2d at 909. However, a notable exception, with rather
unusual "developmental" and environmental implications, is State v. Johnson,
supra. Dexter involved a statute requiring private landowners to participate in reforestation programs, while Johnson dealt with statutory regulations requiring permits for alteration of coastal wetlands.
21. Without providing a definition of "navigability," statutes prohibiting obstructions to navigation have been abundant. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-601 (1956) (obstructions declared public nuisances); S.D.C.L.
§ 46-26-1 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2901 (1955); But see S.C. CODE
ANN. § 70-1 (1962).
22. The historical development of the concept of "indelible navigability" was
discussed in part one of this study. See Leighty, The Source and Scope of
Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV.
391, 427-28 (1970). [Hereinafter cited as Leighty.]
23. See Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 45, 211 N.W. 115, 117 (1926); I
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 35.2 (Clark ed. 1967); 2 FARNHAM, THE LAw
OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1364-65

(1904).

24. Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n v. Hogarth, 81 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1936); Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Muench v. Public Service Comm'n,
261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952). Public recreational water uses may
be treated as one of the "incidents" to the public navigational easement.
See, e.g., Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App.2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio
St. 193, 163 N.E.2d 373 (1959); State v. Malmquist, 114 Vt. 96, 40 A.2d 534
(1944).
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zation" and, substantively, the criteria for designating certain
waters as "public" have remained ambiguous in the face of
increased community requirements for public outdoor recreation.2" However, this emphasis does not diminish the importance of private rights in navigable waters. What is needed
is an effective standard for the demarcation of the scope of
private controls over the usufructs in lakes and streams. The
absence of such a standard means that resource development
and private investments must proceed with some degree of
uncertainty. This may not have a significant negative impact
for some commercial operations, but for the individual investor in riparian lands for the private recreational use of
his family and licensees the impact may be substantial. The
value of solitude, presumably reflected in purchase prices, is
of considerable importance to a highly urbanized society.
Land developments related to recreational water uses emphasize the right of privacy and the values of open space.
Limitations on public enjoyment of these water uses is a
primary basis for investment. These expectations should not
be dismissed without sound bases, intensive economic impact
studies and a mechanism for gradual market adjustments.
The introduction above clearly indicates that there is authorization for legislative shrinking of private interests in lakes
and streams and that broad regulations may fall short of a
"taking." Moreover, expanded approaches to the public trust
doctrine seem to provide a basis for satisfying increased public
demands on these limited resources.27 On the other hand, if no
legitimate basis remains for exclusive (or at least limited) use
and enjoyment of recreational waters by private investment
interests, then this position should be forthrightly declared by
state legislatures. Broad declarations in favor of public rights
are not sufficient. To "regulate" under the no-compensation
rubric of the police power, to destroy even mere usufructs because they were judicialy created at some remote period of
time, requires at least a minimal amount of actual balancing
of the respective interests of private riparians and the public
in concrete contexts.
25. Leighty at 394-97.
26. See generally Note,
supra note 5; Note,
Stream, supra note
27. See Sax, supra note
A.2d 56 (Md. 1971).

Water Recreation-Public Use of "Private" Waters,
Fishing and Recreation Rights in Iowa Lakes and
9.
2. But cf. Kerpelman v. Board of Public Works, 276
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The editorial comments made in the last paragraph do
not necessarily reflect the current status of applicable legal
principles. They were made at this point rather than in their
usual, more appropriate location in the "analysis" section,
in order to provide a preface for the statutory materials
which follow.
Moreover, basic weighing and balancing of interests is
required in the problem areas of conservation, preservation,
lake and stream modifications, and access. "Conservation"
balancing of interests has been adequately discussed in the
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter28 and the Geer v.
Connecticut" lines of cases and will receive no additional
comment. The remaining list of problems will be discussed
in relation to specific state statutes, but a brief reflection on
the problem of access at this point seems justified.
A complete discussion of the access problem involves
questions related to early colonial ordinances,"0 prescriptive
rights, dedications, and the condemnation of public access
sites ;81 therefore full treatment of the problem is beyond the
scope of this presentation. 2 Access is a distinct and separate
issue from that of the existence of public rights in a given lake
or stream; it is quite possible for these rights to exist in the
absence of lawful access.83 On the other hand, when "public
rights" are considered in this study, the assumption is made
that access is available. Seldom does an exercise of a public
right in recreational waters authorize a trespass on riparian
uplands,84 but access from publicly-owned property limits
the significance of this restriction. In sum, access is treated
in this article as part of the scope of the public's rights because
access is either available or can be made available through
28. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
29. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
30. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was discussed in part one. See Leighty
at 415-18. The Great Pond Ordinance is discussed below.
31. E.g., Branch v. Oconto County, 13 Wis. 2d 595, 109 N.W.2d 105 (1961).
32. See generally I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 38 (Clark ed. 1967); Note,
Water Recreation-Public Use of "Private" Waters, supra note 5.
33. See, e.g., Branch v. Oconto County, 13 Wis. 2d 595, 109 N.W.2d 105 (1961).
But see State v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954).
34. See, e.g., Attorney General ex rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, 306 Mich. 432,
11 N.W.2d 193 (1943); Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W.
273 (1898); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). But see Elder
v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954) ; LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 455
(West 1952).
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condemnation procedures. 5 The question of access will be
discussed with respect to some statutes-which do not expressly
provide for access to waters declared "public" and with respect to some which expressly disclaim the creation of any
new rights of access, but the basic assumption that access is
either available or implied in the legislative declaration will
otherwise remain firm.
B. Great Ponds
The Massachusetts Bay Colony Ordinance of 1641-7 provides:
Sec. 2. Every inhabitant who is an householder
shall have free fishing and fowling in any great
ponds, bays, coves and rivers, so far as the sea ebbs
and flows within the precincts of the town where they
dwell, unless the freemen of the said town, or the
general court, have otherwise appropriated them:
Sec. 4. And for great ponds lying in common,
though within the bounds of some town, it shall be free
for any men to fish or fowl there, and may pass and
repass on foot through any man's propriety for that
end, so they trespass not upon any man's corn or
meadow."
The ordinance defines a great pond as an area "containing
more than ten acres of land" 7 and creates public rights in the
35.

See authorities cited note 32 supra. Compare State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn.
408, 123 N.W.2d 699 (1963), with State v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63
N.W.2d 278 (1954).
36. See generally Slater v. Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 49 N.E. 1017 (1898); Locke,
Right of Access to Great Ponds by the Colonial Ordinance, 12 MAINE L.
REV. 148 (1919); Smith, The Great Pond Ordinance-Collectvismin Northern New England, 30 B.U.L. REV. 178 (1950); Waite, Public Rights in
Maine Waters, 17 MAINE L. REV. 161 (1965); Annot. 57 A.L.R.2d 569, 583
(1958). See also Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 335.
37. The water surface area has been modified by subsequent legislative action.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, §§ 1, 36 (1965) (natural ponds of 20 acres or
more); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271.20 (1966). New Hampshire requires
the lake to be in excess of ten acres. Id. at § 271.21; see Concord Mfg. Co.
v. Robertson, 66 N.H. 1, 25 Atl. 718 (1889). The ten acre minimum apparently is still part of the common law of Maine. Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me.
227, 77 Atl. 938 (1910). But there is no statute in point. See generally
Waite, Public Rights in Maine Waters, 17 MAINE L. REV. 161 (1965). The
purpose of the codification may vary the size of the surface acreage.
Compare MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, § 1 (1965) (20 acres or more under
Fish & Game Code) with MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 91, § 35 (1967) (10 acres
or more under Waterways Code).
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waters for surface use and consumptive purposes.3 8 The ordinance itself provides for access ;39 court interpretation treats
the waters is if the state owned them in a proprietary capacity (dominium), rather than merely regulating them in a
sovereign capacity (imperium)."4 In any event, public uses
have been extended under this early enactment beyond fishing and fowling to include most of the fields of recreation."1
However, there has been a tendency to protect private landowners by restricting public access points to lands which are
vacant and unenclosed. " Fresh-water lakes" in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire come within the scope of these
rules relating to great ponds through common law developments."
C. Statutory and Constitutional Definitions of Navigability
The need for effective legislative activity seems clear.4
As indicated in the first part of this study,46 judicial attempts
at a definition of "navigability" have not produced any significant degree of certainty with respect to the scope of pub38.

39.

40.
41.
42.
43.

44.

45.
46.

Gratto v. Palangi, 154 Me. 308, 147 A.2d 455 (1958); City of Auburn v.
Union Water Power Co., 90 Me. 576, 38 Atl. 561 (1897); West Roxbury v.
Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158 (1863); Slater v. Gunn, 170 Mass. 509,
49 N.E. 1017 (1898); Whitcher v. State, 87 N.H. 405, 181 Atl. 549 (1935).
Separate legislation provides the mechanism for public access. MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 131, §§ 1, 34; ch. 91 § 18A (1967). For example, procedures for
obtaining public access may be set in motion by a petition from ten citizens. Id. See also Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to
Navigable Waters, 1958 WIS. L. REv. 335.
See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Union Water Power Co., 90 Me. 576, 587, 38
Atl. 561, 566 (1897).
Gratto v. Palangi, supra note 38; Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441
(1882) ; Slater v. Gunn, supra note 38, Whitcher v. State, supra note 38.
See Slater v. Gunn, supra note 38; cf. Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, supra
note 37 (access statute challenged).
Some of the states subject to great pond regulations have adopted other
rules for streams. Massachusetts, for example, has the following rule for
streams subject to tidal action: ". . . no tidal stream shall be considered
navigable above the point where, on the average throughout the year, it
has a channel less than forty feet wide and four feet deep during the three
hours nearest the hour of high tide." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, § 114
(1965). There was no statute discovered which dealt with nontidal streams
in Massachusetts. New Hampshire, by contrast, appears to have a statutory
definition for navigable, nontidal streams which is similar to the federal
commercial navigability test (expressly rejecting the "log-float" test).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271:9 (1966).
Massachusetts and New Hampshire have specific "great pond" statutes,
but all three states have given meaning to the original colonial ordinance
through case interpretation. See, e.g., Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me. 227, 77
At]. 938 (1910).
See generally Bartke, Navigability in Michigan in Retrospect and Prospect,
16 WAYNE L. REv. 409 (1970).
See Leighty at 392, 432.
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lie rights in lakes and streams. The particular facts and
circumstances related to the water resource, as described in
each case, become significant in judicial determinations of
"navigability "-e.g., inlet and outlet sources, past history of
public use, type of use, location of the water resource, practical necessities and local customs, changes in the utility and
social value attributable to the use in question, public trust
considerations, the regularity of flow, volume and velocity of
flow. However, in the context of actual on-site observations of
bodies of water declared by judicial fiat to be navigable or
nonnavigable, predictability becomes the servant of flexibility.'
1. Definitions of Navigability
On the other hand, few significant patterns have developed in legislative definitions of "navigability." . (The
avoidance of the latter term in favor of a declaration of certain waters being "public" is discussed in the next section.)
The following legislatures seem to have made no attempt to
create a definition of "navigability" or "public waters:"
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia. 8 Among the
states which have attempted a definition, several have merely
drafted a circular statement-declaring navigable waters to be
public, or defining public waters as those which are navi47. See Petition of County Board of Supervisors, 381 Mich. 180, 160 N.W.2d 909
(1968); Attorney General ex 'el. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, 306 Mich. 432, 11
N.W.2d 193 (1943); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 199, 53 N.W. 1139,
1143 (1893). The determination approaches the complexity of defining a
"nuisance" or "obscene" literature. See PROssER, THE LAW OF TORTS 592
(3d ed. 1964).
48.

This does not imply a lack of concern for these waters. See ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-601, 45-101A (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 271.02-.10
(1962) (limits placed on private riparian uses); Id. at § 370.03 (1) (1960)
(beds of navigable waters are property of the state); HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 19-20 (1955) (water resources of paramount importance); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 537.010 - .030 (1967) (certain named waters declared navigable for
purposes of fixing bed title) ; Id. at § 537.020 (Virgin River) ; Id. at § 537.030 (Winnemucca Lake); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 591 (1967) ("navigable waters of the United States" defined); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2901
(1955) (obstruction of navigable water); W.VA. CODE § 61-3-47 (1966).
See also MALONEY, PLAGER & BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATIONTHE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 346-405 (1968).
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gable.40 In either situation the courts, as more fully described
in part three of this study, must provide the ultimate deter-

mination.
State constitutional provisions establish the basis for
public access and recreational uses in some states. For example, the Alaska Constitution provides: "Free access to the
navigable or public waters of the state, as defined by the legislature, shall not be denied any citizen of the United States or
resident of this state .... 5 (Emphasis added.) The Alaska
legislative body has not yet accepted this invitation. Court decisions in Missouri, 5 ' New Mexico,5" Wisconsin,"8 and Wyoming5 4 have placed varying degrees of emphasis on state constitutional declarations when establishing a broad foundation
for recreational surface uses. New Mexico and Wyoming
appear to have taken the strongest position on this point. The
New Mexico Constitution states: "The unappropriated water
of every natural stream.., is hereby declared to belong to the
public ... . "" The New Mexico Supreme Court, in State v.
Red River Valley Co.,"5 took the position that since riparian
rights do not exist in that state, lakes and streams are available
49. Alabama is a typical example: "All navigable waters in this state are public
thoroughfares." ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 38, § 104 (1959). No substantive dimension is provided (by statute) for the Alabama concept of "navigable
waters." Louisiana, under its civil law approach, has declared navigable
water to be "public things." LA. CIr. CODE art. 453 (West, 1952). Therefore,
the state owns navigable waters not in private control on August 12, 1910. LA.
CiV. CODE ANN. § 9.1101 (1965). The limitations on riparians have been
described earlier in this study. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 455 (West 1952) ;
Leighty at 398 n. 27. However, case interpretation may limit the extension of
this public ownership as a basis for public recreation. See Delta Duck Club v.
Barrios, 135 La. 357, 65 So. 489 (1914). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1507.01 (1964) (circular statement in Shore Erosion Control Code). ORE.
REV. STAT. § 780.030 (1969) (navigable waters open to steamboats and
other craft); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 591 (1967); W. VA. CODE § 61-347 (1966).
50. ALASKA CONST. art 8, § 14. See also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.03.010
(1967)
(state sovereignty over submerged lands in the marginal sea
described).
51. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954). The support of the
state constitution was probably only employed as a make-weight.
52. State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
53. Wisconsin has given some attention to its state constitutional version of
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. However, it appears that greater emphasis is placed on the Ordinance itself than on the state constitution. See
Lundberg v. University of Notre Dame, 231 Wis. 187, 282 N.W. 70, 73
(1938) [explanatory memorandum at 285 N.W. 839 (1939)]. See generally
Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958
Wis. L. REv. 335. State use of this ordinance was discussed earlier in this
study. Leighty at 414-18.
54. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
55. N.M. CONST. art. 16, § 2. See also N. M. STAT. ANN. § 75-1-1 (1968).
56. 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
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for recreational uses. 5 7 Wyoming has a similar constitutional
provision." Colorado, on the other hand, has taken the opposite position and has indicated that these sweeping statements
concerning public ownership of waters in western states should
be applied only in the context of water allocation and consumptive uses."
Arkansas statutes have largely been concerned with private riparian rights. In one statute mineral rights in lands under artificially created navigable waters were declared to remain in private ownership, subject to public navigational and
recreational pursuits." Similarly, the Cache River was specifically declared nonnavigable, even though it once floated
6
logs. 1
California and Illinois represent the legislative patterns
in which navigable waters are defined in a commercial context, essentially limited to valuable transportation uses, and
the patterns in which certain waters are declared "navigable"
merely by the operation of public power exercised.2 California law provides that "Navigable waters and all streams of
sufficient capacity to transport the products of the country
are public ways for the purposes of navigation and such transportation.""3 "Navigable waters" are then defined as those
that come within the jurisdiction of the United States Corps
of Engineers plus any others in the state "with the exception
of those privately owned." 6 4 In like manner, the Illinois
statute points in the direction of the federal test for navigability, particularly the expanded test stated in United States
57. Public access across private property is provided by statute. N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 75-1-4, 75-1-5 (1968). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-1-6 (1960)
(authority to float logs).
58. WYo. CONST. art. 8, § 1. Public ownership of the waters apparently means
that private property in Wyoming is subject to an easement to allow these
waters to pass. Upon the waters the public may travel. They may even
step upon the stream beds if necessary to facilitate the recreational travel
easement, but they are prohibited from general wading unrelated to navigation. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145-46 (Wyo. 1961).
59. See Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905). For a list of
these statutory and constitutional passages declaring waters in western
states to be "public" see I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 39.3 at 242-45.
(Clark ed. 1967). See also Johnson, supra note 5 at 33-47.
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 10-1011 (Supp. 1969).
61. Id. at § 21-101 (1968); see Central Clay Drainage Dist. v. Booser, 143 Ark.
18, 219 S.W. 336 (1920).
62. CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE §§ 101-106 (West 1955); ILL. STAT. ANN. Ch. 19 § 41
(1963) (Illinois River and Des Plaines River).
63. CAL. HARB. & NAT. CODE § 100 (West 1955).
64. Id. at § 36 (1970 Supp.). The concluding exception has the same circular
characteristics as those found in other state statutes. See note 49 supra.
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v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. : "any public waters which
are or can be made usable for water commerce. 7766
The type of commercial use and the extent of that activity
have provided the bases for a number of state statutory variations. Idaho, for example, has made navigable waters open
as public highways for fishing purposes below ordinary high
water mark 7 and has defined navigable waters as "... . every
other stream or part of a stream on which logs or timber can
be floated to market or place of use during the high water
season of the year."" The same section defines logs and timber as "any cut timber having a diameter in excess of six (6)
inches." By contrast, Georgia and New Hampshire have
specifically rejected log floating as an acceptable commercial
use for purposes of navigability. Georgia requires ". . . boats
loaded with freight in [the] regular course of trade. The mere
rafting of timber or transporting of wood in small boats shall
not make a stream navigable." 9 The New Hampshire rule is
essentially a copy of the definition in The Daniel Ball," but it
states that the term "navigable waters" shall not apply to
streams which are merely used to float logs.7 ' Another variation is found in the unusual definition drafted by the Iowa
legislature which states that "navigable waters" include lakes
and streams capable of supporting vessels carrying one or
more persons for a total of six months in one year out of every
ten." Historical overtones permeate the Mississippi provision:
All rivers, creeks, and bayous in this state, twentyfive miles in length, that have sufficient depth and
width of water for thirty consecutive days in the
year, for floating a steamboat with carrying capacity
of two hundred bales of cotton, are hereby declared
to be navigable waters of this state. 3
65. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
66. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 19, §§ 153, 252, 285 (1963). See also note 49 supra.
67.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-901 (1961).

68. Id. at § 36-907.
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1303 (1970).
A similar definition is provided for
"navigable tidewater." Id. at § 85-1308. If the water is nonnavigable, then
by statute the riparians are given exclusive use and enjoyment, including
fishing and other recreational pursuits. See id. at §§ 85-1304, 1305.
70. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
71. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271:9 (1966).
72. IOWA CODE § 106.2 (Supp. 1971).
73. MISS. CODE ANN. § 8414 (1957) ; accord, id. at § 686.
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Montana statutes provide for public fishing rights on navigable rivers" and define navigable lakes75 and streams" as all
those which are "navigable in fact" plus all those ". . which
have been meandered and returned navigable by the surveyors
employed by the government of the United States .... I"I In
addition, "streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the country" are declared to be public highways for
purposes of such commercial uses, subject to the proviso that
there shall be no impairment of rights acquired prior to the
enactment. ' Under New York law, "navigable in fact" means
navigable in its natural and unimproved condition.
New
York, like New Hampshire, apparently prefers the federal
test used in The Daniel Ball rather than the expanded Appalachian rule:
"Navigable in fact" shall mean navigable in its natural or unimproved condition, affording a channel
for useful commerce of a substantial and permanent
character conducted in the customary mode of trade
and travel on water. A theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is temporary, precarious and
unprofitable is not sufficient, but to be navigable in
fact a lake or stream must have practical usefulness
to the public as a highway for transportation. 0
74. MONT. REV. CODE § 26-338 (1967) (between the lines of ordinary high
water).
75. Id. at § 26.336.
76. Id. at § 26.337.
77. Id.
78. MONT. REV. CODE § 89-501 (1964). An alternative approach might be to
declare all waters of the State a public resource but state that, "this shall
not be construed as granting any new or additional rights of access nor
as impairing riparian rights. The rights heretofore secured under the
common law shall continue in full force and effect. . . ." Senate Bill No.
1236 (Mich. 1970). This bill died in committee, but similar legislation with
substantial language changes has been proposed for the 1971 session of the
Michigan legislature. See House Bill No. 4948 (Mich. 1971). The thrust
of this particular bill is lake or stream modification or alteration, but the
approach might be equally applicable to public surface use definitions. See
Mich. Dept. of Natural Resources Legislative Proposal No. 7 (1971).
79. N. Y. NAy. LAw § 2(5) (McKinney 1941).
80. Id. This provision, however, is a definition for the limited purposes of
a particular New York Code. Broader recreational uses under case decisions will be discussed in part three.
South Carolina apparently has taken a position at least slightly favoring the Appalachian rule:
All streams which have been rendered or can be rendered capable of
being navigated by rafts of lumber or timber by the removal of accidental obstructions and all navigable watercourses and cuts are hereby
declared navigable streams and such streams shall be common highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of this state as to
citizens of the United States, without any tax or impost therefor,
unless such tax or impost be expressly provided for by the General
Assembly. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-1 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
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Demonstrating the diversity of state views of police power
controls over navigable waters, North Dakota and Oregon
say nothing with respect to "navigability in fact" but borrow
the Montana concept of defining navigability in terms of
surveys made by the federal government." In North Dakota
meandered lakes are navigable for conservation purposes and
for purposes of water development, storage, and distribution.8 2
No statutory comment is made concerning North Dakota
streams, and the scope of surface uses on both lakes and
streams has been left to judicial determination. (Oregon has
dealt with streams in the context of improving navigation.)8"
Moreover, the North Dakota courts have limited sovereign
exercises of power by the legislature to areas below ordinary
high water. 4 Similarly, state statutes may be subject to
judicial review under the federal test for navigability. For
example, an early Oklahoma statute"' was held invalid in the
narrow context of ownership of bed title.8 6 Here the federal
rule is mandatory; subsequently the legislature repealed the
provision."'
South Dakota refers to both "navigable" waters and to
"public" waters in several statutes but provides no definition
for either term.88 Land below ordinary high water mark may
be regulated by state statute.88 However, the legislature has
only attempted to measure the upland boundary of public
and private rights without defining "navigability" and with81.
82.
83.

84.

85.
86.
87.

88.
89.

N.D. CODE ANN. § 61-15-01 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 274.430 (1969).
N.D.. CODE ANN. § 61-15-02 (1960) (limiting police power exercises to areas
below ordinary high water mark). See also note 20 supra and accompanying
text.
In Oregon any watercourse "susceptible of being made navigable" can be
improved for useful transportation. The rule is similar to the federal test
under the Appalachian standard. See ORE. REv. STAT. § 780.010 (1969).
Once a watercourse becomes navigable, it is declared a public highway for
steamboats and other craft. Id. at § 780.030. See also id. at § 274.430 (beds
of meandered lakes declared to be state owned). However, as in the case
of North Dakota, surface use rules have turned to common law developments. See Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
See State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949). However, there is
dicta to the effect that attempts to destroy totally a given water resource
could be prevented by legislative action above high water. See Bigelow v.
Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 163, 69 N.W. 570, 573 (1896).
OKLA. REV. LAWS (1910) § 6639.
Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 75, § 1 (1965).
See S.D.C.L. ANN. §§ 46-25-5, 46-26-1 (1969). Section 46-25-5 describes
"public waters" on the basis of the amount of contamination they may
lawfully receive, as determined by a stream classification committee.
Id. at § 43-17-1.
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out spelling out the extent and scope of usufructuary surface
interests for recreational purposes:
Except where the grant under which the land is held
indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland,
when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream,
takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low-water
mark, and all navigable rivers shall remain and be
deemed public highways.9
The Texas definition is perhaps the most consistent with
the principles of predictability:
All streams so far as they retain an average width
of thirty feet from the mouth up shall be considered
navigable streams...."
However, Texas courts have insisted that the determination of
navigability is a judicial question." Public lakes in Texas are
those for which the state owns the bed or "reserves the right
of access for its citizens for fishing, boating, hunting or other
recreation." 9 Thus the mere lack of roads to such a lake (or
to a stream navigable under the thirty-foot rule) creates a
"public necessity" for purposes of authorizing public road
construction. 4
Vermont statutes contain a mixture of definitions of
"navigable" waters and "public" waters. "Navigable waters"
mean:
Lake Champlain, Lake Memphremagog, the Connecticut River, all natural inland lakes within Vermont
and all streams, ponds, flowages and other waters
within the territorial limits of Vermont, including
the Vermont portion of boundary waters, which are
boatable under the laws of this state. 5
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at § 43-17-2.
TEx. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5302 (1962).
State v. Bradford, 121 Tex. 515, 50 S.W.2d 1065 (1932).
TEx. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6711a(7) (1960).
id.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (Supp. 1970). There is also a broad public
trust declaration with respect to state lakes.
Public lands lying under lakes and ponds which are public waters of
Vermont are a public trust, and it is hereby declared to be the policy
of the state that these lands shall be managed in the public interest
and to promote the general welfare .... Id. at tit. 29, § 401 (1970).
However, these declarations may relate only to the jurisdiction of the
Vermont Water Resources Board.
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On the other hand, "public" waters mean "navigable waters
excepting those waters in private ponds and private pre,,."
The statutory definition of a private pond is
serves..
" ....
a natural pond of not more than twenty acres or an arti-

ficial pond entirely upon his premises .... "97 However, these
definitions are found in a shoreland protection act. Actual
recreational uses may still require case decisions.98 (Hence
there is the general caveat to the reader not to review any one
of the three parts of this study in isolation.) 99 Moreover, the
definitions in Vermont as well as many of those for the other
states discussed may have the inherent limitation of being
defined only for the purpose of a particular code.' 0 The mere
fact that a legislature has drafted a definition in some context
may or may not provide a basis for determining the scope of
public or private surface rights in any given state. A full survey of the cases and statutes in each state therefore is essential." 1 Here the objective is merely to demonstrate the
amount of legislative activity that has occurred to date.
Virginia is another illustration of this last point. Virginia
provides that the Commonwealth, subject to prior land grants,
owns the beds of bays, rivers, and creeks (as well as the shores
of the sea) within its territorial jurisdiction. This bed ownership is also declared to be the basis for establishing a "common" with respect to these lands to be used by "all the people
of the State for the purpose of fishing and fowling, and taking
and catching oysters and other shellfish, subject to . . . any

future laws that may be passed by the General Assembly." 0 2
Another section of the same statute declares riparian rights
to extend only to low-water mark.' But on the face of the
legislation there is little more than the impression that the
public may pursue diverse fields of recreation over the surface
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (Supp. 1970).
Id. at § 5210.
See, e.g., State v. Malmquist, 114 Vt. 96, 40 A.2d 534 (1944).
Part three will integrate the statutory rules developed in this article with
applicable case law.
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 537.010 - .030 (1967); N.Y. NAV. LAW § 2(5)

(McKinney 1941).
101. This has been done in a few states. See, e.g., Bartke, Navigability in Michigan in Retrospect and Prospect, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 409

(1970);

Waite,

Public Rights in Indiana Waters, 37 IND. L.J. 467 (1962); Waite, Public
Rights in Maine Waters, 17 MAiNE L. REV.161 (1965) ; Waite, Public Rights
to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 335.

102. VA. CODE § 62.1-1 (1968).
103. Id. at § 62.1-2.
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waters of Virginia's inland lakes and streams. If navigability
remains a relevant consideration for dividing private and
public rights, the boundary is left unclear. As indicated earlier
in this part of the study, such declarations may be merely a
convenient method for expressing the state's intention to provide public surface rights over "private" waters, those where
bed title is held by the riparian."' Of course, the statute itself only vaguely reveals the beds which remain state owned.
Therefore, courts... may still be required to measure the respective limits of public and private interests under the federal test for navigability. In short, like the special purpose
legislation in the last paragraph, this statute may be limited
to a rather narrow area of application. If indeed public rights
are limited to state owned beds, then these rights will be measured by a judicial determination of the navigability of each
lake and stream under the federal test in The Daniel Ball °e
on the date Virginia was admitted to the Union.
Wisconsin and West Virginia are the last two states
which have demonstrated legislative activity concerning "navigability." As indicated earlier, West Virignia does not provide a definition of this term. However, "navigable" and
"floatable" are used in a context which provides a weak argument that the two terms were intended to be used synonymously.' ' On the other hand, Wisconsin has a rather complete
statutory program. The Wisconsin Constitution, which was
discussed in part one of this study,' provides:
* '*the river Mississippi and the navigable
waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence,
and the carrying places between the same, shall be
common highways and forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the
States, without any tax, impost or duty thereUnited
10 9
for.

104. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678
(1965) ; Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 89 S.E.2d 23 (1955).
106. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). See also Utah v. United States, 89
U.S.L. WEEK 4717 (U.S. June 7, 1971).
107. W. VA. CODE § 61-3-47 (1966). See also W. VA. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
108. Leighty at 414-18. See generally Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have
Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 335; Waite, The Dilemma
of Water Recreation and a Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L. Rav. 542.
109. WIS. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
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This provision is complemented by broad statutory language:
(1) All lakes wholly or partly within this state
which are navigable in fact are declared to be navigable and public waters, and all persons have the
same rights therein and thereto as they have in and to
any other navigable or public waters.
(2) All streams, sloughs, bayous and marsh outlets, which are navigable in fact for any purpose
whatsoever, are declared navigable ..
2. Other Concepts of Public Waters
While Indiana has some early case law in point, statutes
have been the focal point for providing a basis for public
surface rights to recreational waters. Since Professor Waite
has provided a thorough discussion of this particular state,11 1
only a few brief comments need be made here.1 12 Moreover, the
110. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.10 (1964). (Emphasis added.) See also Note, The
Muench Case: A Better Test of Navigability, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 486.
111. See generally Waite, Public Rights in Indiana Waters, 37 IND. L.J. 467
(1962). See also Note, Fishing and Recreational Rights in Iowa Lakes and
Streams, 53 IOWA L. R~v. 1322, 1339-40 (1968); Note, The State v. the
Riparian-A Problem of Water Use and Control, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 257.
112. There is some mixture of "navigable waters" and "public waters" in the
Indiana statutory scheme. "Public" waters are discussed in the text, but
notice should be given to "navigability" because many states (e.g., Michigan) are still struggling with statutory definitions and approaches to that
term. Indiana, like California and Illinois, has declared certain named
waters to be "navigable." E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 68-109 (Burns 1961)
(Kankakee River).
The current session of the Michigan legislature will have before it for
consideration a stream classification bill. The bill was developed by the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources but does not yet have an
official Senate number. Section one of the bill was drafted by this author.
The remainder of the bill is largely the product of others and provides for
(1) a stream classification committee (now designated the Michigan
Natural Resources Commission) which is appointed by the governor (2)
petitions to the committee by individual riparians, county boards of commissioners, or state water agencies "to make a finding and determination
of the public or private status of all or a part of such waters" (3) notices
and public hearings (4) a determination of which waters or segments
thereof are "public" (5) filing the determination as "prima facie proof
of the fact of public or private status for all purposes, unless modified by
a court order" (6) judicial review by aggrieved riparians. The "public"
waters definition in section one deliberately omitted consideration of lakes
(based on the assumption that significant lakes would have a navigable
inlet or outlet or would have other public access points), but it does provide
the standard under which the Commission is to make its determination:
Sec. 1. A river, stream, creek or channel which, during any stage,
including the ordinary high water stages, has been or is being used
or is capable of being used in its natural and ordinary condition for
floating any boat, canoe, skiff, or craft with at least on person
aboard, or for floating products for transportation purposes is declared
public. Mich. Dept. of Natural Resources Legislative Proposal No. 7
(1971).
In like manner, Indiana has established the mechanism for stream
classification:
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primary objective here is merely to describe the statutory
approaches and to reserve categorical statements about state
"rules" for the case interpretations provided in part three
of this study.
The Indiana legislature has not emphasized bed ownership and has instead been concerned with usufructuary interests. Streams have been subjected to broad exercises of the
police power. While all public rights have not been specifically
listed (which would perhaps be both impossible and undesirable), recreational surface uses may be guaranteed to the
extent that they serve a "useful and beneficial purpose:"
Water in any natural stream, natural lake, or other
natural body of water in the state of Indiana which
may be applied to any useful and beneficial purpose
is hereby declared to be a natural resource and public
water of the state of Indiana and subject to control
and/or regulation for the public welfare as hereinafter determined by the general assembly of the state
of Indiana. Diffused surface water flowing vagrantly over the surface of the ground shall not be
regarded as public water. . .. "'
On the other hand, public rights in lakes have received even
greater legislative attention: First the public is declared to
have a vested interest in these waters.
The natural resources and the natural scenic
beauty of Indiana are declared to be a public right,
and the public of Indiana is hereby declared to have
a vested right in the preservation, protection, and
enjoyment of all the public fresh water lakes, of Indiana in their present state, and the use of such
waters for recreational purposes." 4
Then public fresh water lakes are defined not by reference
to bed title but by using the police power to codify existing
The boards of commissioners in the several counties in this state are
authorized to declare any stream or water-course in their respective
counties navigable, on the petition of twenty-four [24] free-holders of
the county, residing in the vicinity of the stream ....
IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 68-101 (Burns 1961).
However, the county board is only to make a study and to declare a stream
navigable "if satisfied that the stream, if navigable, would be of public
utility." Id. at § 68-102. Thus, the board is not provided with a standard
on which to rest its determination.
113. Id. at § 27-1402 (Burns 1970).
114. Id. at § 27-620 (1970). (Emphasis added.)

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

25

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 6 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 1
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VI

customs, basing public use on a theory of common law dedication." ' Rather than risking the constitutional challenge of
a "taking," the sovereign exercise is extended only to essentially unused "rights" for which public user has been acquiesced in by riparian owners.
Public fresh water lakes shall mean all lakes
which have been used by the public with the acquiescence of any or all riparian owners .... "'
Finally, a brief listing of public rights in Indiana lakes is
attempted:
The state of Indiana is hereby vested with full power
and control of all of the public fresh water lakes in
the state of Indiana both meandered and unmeandered and the state of Indiana shall hold and control
all of said lakes in trust for the use of all of its citizens for fishing, boating, swimming,. . . and for any
purposes for which said lakes are ordinarily used and
adapted, and no person owning lands bordering any
such lakes shall have the exclusive right to the use
of water of any such lake or any part thereof."'
Bed title is also viewed as immaterial by the Minnesota
legislature. Reference is made in the statute to existing rights,
but these probably include only naked title to submerged
lands."' Riparian usufructuary considerations have been
subordinated to surface use and enjoyment by the public." 9
Thus, all waters (whether a lake or a stream) which are
"capable of substantial beneficial public use are public waters
subject to the control of the state."'2 0 This statute, recognizing the mandatory nature of the federal test for navigability
in the narrow context of bed title, has extended controls for
surface use to areas in which the submerged lands are privately owned:
The public character of water shall not be determined exclusively by the proprietorship of the under115. See authorities cited note 111 supra.
116. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-621 (Burns 1970). (Emphasis added.) See also Sax,
supra note 2 at 562-63 (distribution of natural resources as trust assets
between public and private interests).
117. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-654 (Burns 1970). (Emphasis added).
118. See Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 694 (1960).
119. See State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699 (1963); Johnson v.
Seifert, supra note 118. But cf. State v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63
N.W.2d 278 (1954).
120. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38 (1964).
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lying, overlying, or surrounding land or on whether it
is a body or stream of water which was navigable in
fact or susceptible of being used as a highway for
commerce at the time this state was admitted to the
union. This section is not intended to affect determination of the ownership of the beds of lakes or
streams.'
The precise extent of public rights is unclear, but private
riparian interests probably do not extend beyond bed title,
all surface uses being held in common. The statute itself does
not state this position with respect to recreational uses quite
so bluntly, but case interpretations have gone a considerable
distance in that direction.'22 However, it should be noted that
the right of a citizen to exercise one of these uses is protected
under this system in an indirect manner. The state merely
controls the waters by protecting them from being modified or
consumed to the detriment of recreational functions."'
Ohio and Utah, by contrast, have mentioned "public"
waters on a much more limited basis. For example, under its
drain code Ohio has created public rights in artificial watercourses serving as agricultural drainage ditches. After the
watercourse has been established for seven years, the public
has the same rights (left unspecified) to these waters as they
have to natural watercourses, but subject to subsequent improvement projects. ' Similarly, Utah has declared all waters
within the territorial jurisdiction of Utah to be the property
of the public.' 25 However, except for New Mexico and Wyoming (discussed earlier), these declarations in most western
states probably were intended only to control consumptive
(not surface) uses. 2 '
121. Id. See also MINN. CONST. art. II, § 2.
122. See authorities cited note 119 supra.
123. See State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699 (1963).
The broad interest of the public in the beneficial use of the
numerous and varied lakes of Minnesota does not lend itself to cataloging the countless ways in which any particular interference with
public waters may be detrimental to public use and enjoyment. The
standard must necessarily be broad and rest upon the application of
judgment to a given set of facts. Moreover, the character of the change
must be one which affects the public as distinguished from private
interest. The statute is not designed to protect private rights, since a
remedy for their infringement is available. Id., at 417, 123 N.W.2d at
705-06.
124. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6131.59 (1954).
125. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (1968).
126. See Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905). See also Monroe
v. State, 111 Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759 (1946).
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III. CONCLUSION
A. Analysis
As long ago as the Institutes of Justinian, running water
belonged collectively to the people. At some point in time the
law of real property began to place emphasis on exclusive use
and enjoyment by private interests. To oversimplify, movements toward or away from collective ownership of natural
resources appear historically to have been partially a function
of population density-the more extensive the resource, the
more available for allocation to private control. As indicated
in the first part of this study, under Anglo-American common
law developments, some peculiar property concepts emerged;
dry land was treated in a different manner than was the navigable lake or stream and its bed. In a somewhat different
context, Mr. Justice Holmes has perhaps captured the essence
of the problem: "Upon this point, a page of history is worth
a volume of logic."' 2 7
As a nation approaches its two-hundredth anniversary, it
might not be presumptuous to suggest that a return to more
collective recreational "ownership" and use of lakes and
streams is in order. The weight of history on the source of
public and private rights in navigable waters (discussed in
part one of this study) and upon the scope of these rights
(as more particularized in part three) is not to be treated
lightly. The expectations of private investments should not be
cast aside by a single legislative enactment. However, a
theoretical basis for radical change exists in most states.
Outside some general statements (frequently made by way of
conclusion and not as the product of analysis) to the effect
that riparian rights are property rights which cannot be destroyed-the constitutional challenges do not appear to be
significant."' 8 On the other hand, the legislative mechanism
should provide for a gradual elimination of existing, private
riparian rights in navigable and other public waters. If without begging the question the enactment "takes" only "unused" rights, proceeds on the basis of the police power, and
protects existing rights and expectations by treating them as
127. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
128. See generally authorities cited note 9 supra.
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nonconforming uses and providing for their eventual elimination-a state court should have an ample range of theoretical bases for developing concepts of collective "ownership"
and expanded public recreational use of surface waters. The
implications of sovereignty discussed in the introduction seem
clear; this approach is the direct one. An alternative approach
might be to limit the transferability of the surface use aspects
of the "bundle" of riparian rights. This approach might be
supplemented by heavy taxation of the right to transfer these
usufructs as part of the land value. The taxation might provide the incentive to transfer these limited surface interests
to a public body.'29 Other bases for direct elimination of
private controls over surface use, under the police power,
include variations of the public trust doctrine, state counterparts to the federal navigational servitude,180 and expansions
of the concepts of "navigability" and "public" waters.'81 It
would appear that a legislature could, using any of the alternatives listed here, provide for public use of resources traditionally described as "private waters." The heart of the
problem is an analysis of the nature of the "property" interest in surface water use-whether this interest is held in
public or private "ownership." At least one author has
grasped the essence of this interest:
The legal basis of this governmental power to control the uses of watercourses may take one of several
particularized forms; nevertheless through all of
these forms run the common threads of the public
good and those governmental powers inherent in any
organized society. Unquestionably all property
in society is held subject to being affected by the
powers of the sovereign, exercised in the common
good. However, it is noteworthy that the governmental power over watercourses is more substantial than
that relating to property rights in things other than
fact lies
of this
explanation
natural
resources.
in the greater
publicThe
interest
in natural
resources.182
2
129. Cf, MALONEY, PLAGER & BLADWIN, supra note 48, § 1 5.3 (c).

130.

See Comment, The State Navigation Servitude, 4 LAND & WATER L. REV.

521 (1969). See also Note, Public Right of Navigation and the Rule of No
Compensation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 236 (1968).
131. See generally authorities cited notes 9, 10 supra.
132. Lauer, supra note 9 at 223.
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A further consideration is environmental protection legislation. Michigan has recently passed a unique form of legislation designed to facilitate private litigation to protect "the
air, water and other natural resources and the public trust
therein."'5 8 The public trust doctrine includes the concept
that the general public, collectively representative of state
sovereignty, owns the natural resources of the state-not in
the proprietary sense, but as an extension of residual irnperium. Hence, when the distributive share of available resources (e.g., surface waters) has been reduced by allocations
to private control, the "public trust" has been impaired.'
Though somewhat unlikely, a court could therefore extend
this piece of legislation to eliminate private interests in navigable waters. It might require, however, a number of individual suits.
A final problem is that of public responsibility. Even if
the legislature turns all surface rights over to public use,
riparians will still live along these bodies of water. Excessive
public use of traditionally private waters could destroy not
only the values related to privacy and aesthetics but also all
other reasonable upland property values. A brief reading of
the facts in Botton v. State 3 ' will provide a description of
the extent to which public abuses may go. The state has the
obligation through appropriate legislation and implementation to protect the riparians' interests.'3 6
B. A Proposal
The significance of a page of history soon becomes obvious when one attempts to draft a legislative definition of
navigable or public waters. "Vested" rights become important; the balancing of public and private interests is essential. This author can throw few stones at those who continue
to attempt to divide public and private rights on the basis of
133. P.A. No. 127 of Public Acts of Michigan (1970). (Emphasis added.)
134. See generally Sax, supra note 2. But see Kerpelman v. Board of Public
Works, 276 A.2d 56 (Md. 1971).
135. 69 Wash. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966).
136. Id. at 757, 420 P.2d at 356. See generally Johnson & Morry, Filling and
Building on Small Lakes-Time for Judicial and Legislative Controls, 45
WASH. L. Ruv. 27 (1970); Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill Public Waters Without Public Permission-Washington'sLake Chelan Decision, 45 WASH. L.
REv. 65 (1970); Note, The Tale of Two Lakes-A New Chapter in Washington Water Law, 43 WASH. L. REv. 475 (1967).
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the "navigability" of the water. Strong lobbying groups
must be considered in the drafting process if any realistic
hope of passage is to be created. Hence, frequently the navigability touchstone must remain. However, the more indirect
the approach the more difficult implementation becomes.
Therefore, the following proposal is based on the assumption
that the more direct legislative approaches described in this

article will be employed.
The first requirement would appear to be a broad state
constitutional mandate. The Michigan provision might be
a starting point.
The conservation and development of the natural
resources of the state are hereby declared to be of
paramount public concern in the interest of the
health, safety and general welfare of the people.
The legislature shall provide for the protection of
the air, water and other natural resources of the state
from pollution, impairment and destruction.la'
However, a more direct approach declaring the public ownership of usufructuary interests, and patterned after the lan-

guage of the Minnesota statute quoted above, might be more
appropriate.'
To provide a degree of certainty to support
the mandate, a description of both public and private rights
is required. The language of the Indiana statutes appears
sufficiently forceful to serve this function.'
On the other hand, one may find himself in the position
of this author when asked to avoid the problems of "naviga137. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. 4, § 52.
138. See Note 121 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 111-117 supra and accompanying text.
Michigan has recently passed the Natural River Act of 1970 under
which the Michigan Natural Resources Commission is given authority to
designate wild and scenic rivers. To implement this program the Commission is given broad administrative rule-making powers. In addition, state
and/or local zoning is authorized.
The commission, in the interest of the people of the state and future
generations, may designate a river or portion thereof, as a natural
river area for the purpose of preserving and enhancing its values for
water conservation, its free flowing condition and its fish, wildlife,
boating, scenic, aesthetic, flood plain, ecologic, historic and recreational
values and uses. The area shall include adjoining or related lands as
appropriate to the purposes of the designation.
P.A. No. 231 of Public Acts of Michigan (1970).
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bility" and at the same time to codify the common law concerning rights in public waters.1 4 The task of course is impossible. However, looking hard at the compromise requirements of the legislative process described above concerning
lobbyists, and attempting to provide at least a modicum of
certainty, the following passage was drafted without apology:141
Sec.1. A river, stream, creek or channel which,
during any stage, including the ordinary high water
stages, has been or is being used or is capable of being
used in its natural and ordinary condition for floating any boat, canoe, skiff, or craft with at least one
person aboard, or for floating products for transportation purposes is declared public.

140. The legislative efforts in Michigan have been a reaction to a recent Michigan
case: Petition of County Board of Supervisors, 381 Mich. 180, 160 N.W.2d
909 (1968). See generally Bartke, Navigability in Michigan in Retrospect
and Prospect, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 409 (1970).
141. For a discussion of some of the limitations of the bill see note 112 supra.
The Michigan struggle for an adequate legislative definition has been a
political issue for some time. See House Bill No. 2377 (Mich. 1970) ; House
Bill No. 3105 (Mich. 1967). These earlier bills never passed.
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